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Female entrepreneurship in Africa: exploring a new methodological frontier of strength 
of weak ties (SWT) in a principal-agent (P-A) paradigm 
 
Introduction 
This paper builds upon the conceptual work of Nziku and Struthers, (2018) which developed 
an innovative taxonomy for analysing the Strength of Weak Ties (SWT) concept, first 
developed by Granovetter, (1973) within a Principal-Agent (P-A) paradigm (Jensen and 
Meckling,1976). In developing countries, particularly in Africa, there is an emerging literature 
which highlights the unique obstacles faced by women entrepreneurs who start and develop 
their own businesses (De Vita, et al, 2014; Minniti and Naude, 2010; Jamali, 2009; and Naude 
and Havenga, 2005). The role of social networks in facilitating female entrepreneurial activities 
has gained attention in the literature as well as creating potential sources of social capital 
(Brixiova and Kangoye, 2016; Agholor et al, 2015; and Birley, 1985).The gender lens is an 
important element in this exploration of the SWT concept and the P-A paradigm due to its 
validity in explaining the contribution of entrepreneurial activities of women and network 
utilisation (Williams and Patterson, 2018; Rouse, Treanor, and Fleck, 2013; and Marlow and 
Martinez Dy, 2018).This will be highlighted in this paper by developing a new methodological 
approach which further develops the taxonomy with the ultimate aim to apply it empirically 
in selected African countries. 
 
The aim of the paper is to take to the next stage the taxonomy of SWT developed in Nziku and 
Struthers (2018) as a tool for mitigating P-A conflicts as they are experienced by female 
entrepreneurs in Africa .The taxonomy highlights the mechanisms through which African 
women can overcome some of the obstacles they face when setting up and developing their 
entrepreneurial ventures. The authors provide further elaboration of the taxonomy in the 
context of female entrepreneurs across diverse economic sectors in Africa. Key objectives will 
be: firstly to explore how a P-A paradigm can elucidate the SWT using indicators from the 
paradigm; secondly to examine the challenges faced by female entrepreneurs in Africa; and 
thirdly to design a new methodological framework for integrating the SWT concept with the 
P-A paradigm.  
 











Table1: Principal-Agent Taxonomy (Nziku and Struthers, 2018) 
Principal Agent Parameters Men Women Differences 
1) Assumptions: (personal interest, 
rationality, risk aversion) 
 Gender balance and performance 
High-personal interest, (Tagg and Wilson, 2012) 
Rationality 
Risk aversion-Low  
Low-personal interest (Kamal et al., 2009; 
Gibb, 1993) 
Rationality 
High-risk aversion (Fielden et al., 2003; 
Nziku, 2012; Coleman, 2002; Nchimbi, 2002) 
Men – Low risk aversion (+) 
Women – High risk aversion (-) 
2) Contracts: behavioural based v outcomes 
based 
Aversion to behaviour based contracts . 
 
Prefer outcomes based contracts . 
Prefer behaviour based contracts(Essers and 
Benschop, 2009; Carter, et al., 2003) 
Aversion to outcomes based contracts . 
Based on different use of networks: 
 Women tend to use weak-tie 
networks(behaviour based) (-) 
 Men tend to use strong-ties 
networks (outcomes based)(+) 
3) Goal conflict 
Incentives-misalignment (Asymmetric 
Information), moral hazard, adverse 
selection  
 Influence and motive 
Asymmetric information(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1973; Stigler, 1961, Stiglitz, 1983) 
For men, moral hazard and adverse selection 
may be higher due to their greater use of 
outcomes based contracts (and also strong ties) 
which tend to thrive on more competition and 
less on cooperation between agents . 
Asymmetric information 
 
For women, moral hazard and adverse 
selection may be lower due to social 
objectives, impact of trust and the role of 
symbolic networks which are centred on weak 
ties . 
Influence and motive: 
 Women tend to have social impact 
in their businesses (eg: Grameen 
Bank model) (+) 
 
 Men are more motivated by high 




4) Risk-sharing:  
  
 Use of networks  
For men, networks tend to be formal, structured, 
and interconnected (ie: strong ties). 
For women, networks are looser, more 




Differences in use of networks: 
 Women tend to use their own 
social and informal networks to 
minimise risk (risk-sharing and risk 
pooling as in Grameen Bank  
Model)(+) 
 Men tend to use mostly formalised 
networks to minimise risks(-) 
5)Transaction costs: (eg search costs; 
brokers fees etc) 
This relates to economies of scale and scope 
(joint/multiple products, bundling, product 
diversification etc.)                
Men have advantages in maximising economies 
of scale, and especially economies of scope  
through combining loans across different 
projects, thereby minimising transaction costs; 
(relates also to scaleability issue)(Panzarand 
Willig1977; 1981)  
 
Women have higher transaction costs 
compared with males.  
Unequal transaction costs: 
 Women tend to lack high value 
assets  to  be used as collateral 
(leading to high transaction costs) 
(-) 
 Men have high value assets 
(leading to lower transaction costs) 
(+) 
(This outcome may  also be a function of the 
size and frequency of the loans entrepreneurs 
require to borrow) 
6)Verification and monitoring costs: 
 (This relates to contracts:(type, formality 
vs informality, length of contract, renewal 
terms etc) 
 
Men, because they already have track records, 
will benefit from lower verification and 
monitoring costs compared with women.  
Women will tend to have higher verification 
and monitoring costs due to their lack of track 
records as well as their preferred contract 
types (This disadvantage may also be 
increased by their reliance on “weak ties”). 
This again links to the issue of whether the 
contract is outcomes based or behaviour based 
(from P-A theory) 
 Since women tend to be more 
involved in behaviour based 
contracts, this leads to higher 
verification and monitoring costs 
for the Principal (-) 
 Since men tend to prefer outcomes 
based contracts, this leads to lower 
verification and monitoring costs 






Underpinning this study is a positivistic approach derived from a behavioural/experimental 
economics perspective.  Using a deductive approach, the 6 key P-A indicators developed in the 
Nziku and Struthers paper are analysed namely: attitude towards risk; behaviour-based versus 
target based contracts; asymmetric information; risk-sharing; transaction costs; verification 
and monitoring costs. A future empirical study will be developed using an experimental design 
strategy with a quantitative approach (based on questionnaire), which has antecedents in the 
behavioural/experimental economics literature, especially the seminal works by Kahnemann 
and Tversky, (1979) and Smith, (1998), will be related to the SWT concept (Granovetter,1973).  
 
A specific issue is to challenge the accepted wisdom based on an ‘expected utility’ approach 
which has at its core an implicit assumption that: a) agents are risk-averse and; b) female 
entrepreneurs are likely to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (see Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). Much of the extant entrepreneurship literature has taken this as a sine qua 
non (see Ackah et al, 2019). To this end, empirical constructs will be adopted such as the need 
to replace the assumption of risk aversion with that of loss aversion. This approach assumes 
more realistically an asymmetric information construct in relation to the issue of how agents 
(especially female entrepreneurs) approach the ‘more versus less risk’ decision in their business 
decisions. The paper now goes on to discuss some of the key concepts from that literature 
which will then be applied to our new methodological approach. 
 
Relevant literature  
 
Reasonable gain and affordable loss 
 
Within the entrepreneurship literature it has been assumed that women are more risk averse 
than men when undertaking business and investment decisions. In this paper we firstly try to 
explore whether this is in fact a sine qua non of research, or whether it is an assumption that 
should be challenged and tested. Secondly, we develop a new empirical methodology based on 
several concepts from behavioural/experimental economics that will allow us to test such 
assumptions in field work within a number of African countries. 
 
Our starting point is to combine concepts such as kinship, social structure, and if appropriate, 
the existence of extreme poverty,within an African context, and especially in relation to women 
who decide to establish a business out of necessity rather  than through choice. George et al 
(2015) in a study of entrepreneurship in Kenya suggest that obtaining a reasonable gain from 
such endeavours, especially at subsistence or extreme poverty levels, is the key determinant of 
entrepreneurial activity. Based on a prospect theory framework this argues that a decision to 
be risk-taking within a business or investment context is not based solely, on an expected utility 
approach. Rather such decisions are framed within a context of reasonable gain based on a 
given reference point that is determined in advance but is also bounded by another reference 




From an empirical perspective this gives researchers a foundation to be able to assess the 
different motivations of women compared with male entrepreneurs. For example, if we ask 
people, male and female, what  for them is the spectrum or gap between these two extreme 
reference points, we can test whether the gap (in monetary terms) is greater for men compared 
with women. This will be done within an experimental economics approach which provides 
respondents with a range of different monetary returns relevant to their own contexts and 
circumstances. We highlight this approach in the Appendix. Depending on the empirical 
outcomes, this will allow us to conclude, at least within the context of our study, whether 
women can be considered to be more risk-averse than men. 
 
We argue that such a methodological approach will enhance our understanding of the extent to 
which women entrepreneurs can always be assumed to be more risk-averse than men which is 
the case in much of the extant literature on this topic. Empirical studies by Ackah et al (2019) 
and Humbert and Brindley (2013) have certainly tried to challenge the assumption of higher 
levels of risk-aversion among women entrepreneurs. In Ackah et al (2019) this is based on 
potential differences in self-reported perceptions of risk in Ghana and Uganda. Using a non-
linear decomposition approach they conclude that women entrepreneurs in both countries are 
more risk averse than their male counterparts, though this is more pronounced in Ghana than 
in Uganda. Empirically,the study concluded that differences in risk perceptions are due to 
unexplained components, and therefore might be regarded as a residual elements, though in 
Ghana such differences were attributed to prior educational levels as well as experience of 
running a business before.     
 
In the Humbert and Brindley (2013) paper, gender differences in attitudes towards risk are 
explained in the context of the socio-economic context in which women entrepreneurs have to 
operate. This is highlighted in their empirical study of Irish women business owners in which 
the crucial (and universal) role of motherhood and women’s caring roles can be expected to 
heavily influence their attitudes towards risk-taking. Although based on a limited sample of 
women entrepreneurs (10), this paper is insightful because it separates out three sub-
components of risk namely: risk perception, risk propensity, and risk preparedness. These are  
related systematically to a range of socio-economic contingent factors (eg family 
responsibilities, lack of collateral, family background, choice of sector, etc) which will have an 
influence- individually and collectively- on these three different components of risk. The 
authors suggest that one possible outcome of such factors will be a higher level of self-
screening of potential entrepreneurial investments  
 
Dew et al (2009) extend the discussion of these key concepts further by differentiating the 
decision on the amount individuals can afford to lose and the amount they are willing to lose 
in order to plunge into entrepreneurship. They say…”the fundamental asymmetry between the 
calculability of losses and the unpredictability of gains fuels the creative process… (which is 
at the heart of entrepreneurship)…and is an outcome of it”… (p108). This implies that the 
mechanistic way in which economists usually calculate risk/return trade-offs has to be modified 
to take full account of such factors as: identity; values and preferences; emotions (including 
fear of failure and/or suspicion of success); rationality (eg to distinguish as Simon (1976) does 
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between procedural and substantive rationality); over-confidence and over-optimism. It also 
begs the question whether affordable loss (and potential gain) are exogenous or endogenous 
elements; for example sector specific. In essence as Dew et al (2009, p 112) state…”Thus 
consistent with bounded rationality, affordable loss involves using a smaller information set 
than is required in (normative) expected returns reasoning”… 
 
The above discussion points to the possibility that there may be inherent differences between 
males and females not just in their willingness to “take the plunge” as this may be viewed 
simply as throwing “good money after bad”, but also in their ability to do so. Of course, as 
Dew at al (2009) also argue, such gender differences may also appear in terms of the “depth” 
of the entrepreneurial plunge as well as the extent to which it is reversible, which again may 
have gender implications. A yet further factor to consider is the extent to which females may 
have motives other than personal profit maximisation eg positive community outcomes. The 
role of kinship, which itself is a key component of the SWT concept can be expected to play a 
part here too. We now turn to this aspect in the paper.  
 
Role of kinship (aka SWT) in entrepreneur networks in Africa 
 
Do female entrepreneurs (eg in Africa) benefit from kinship systems in their business 
decisions? Do these kinship systems contribute to the SWT effect highlighted by Granovetter 
(1973)? Khayesi et al (2014), based on an empirical study of small firms in Uganda suggest 
that although kinship or family ties assist entrepreneurs in raising capital for their businesses, 
they also come at the cost of increasing the costs of such networks. This effect of course 
depends on the size of the network or the reach of the ties, especially family. Inevitably the 
larger and more complex is the network-whilst this can augment the potential sources of 
resources for the business-it can also add disproportionately to the costs of operating the 
network. Extended family commitments in particular can increase agency costs and such 
commitments are very common in Africa (Gomez-Mejia et al 2001; Schulze et al, 2001; Khavul 
et al 2009). A commonly held view is that such shared identities from extended family ties can 
lead to opportunism and free-riding. The question in this paper is whether females, within an 
entrepreneurship context, are more prone to this outcome than males  
 
Tournament effects: possible gender differences 
 
Another possible conceptual and/or methodological difference between women and men in the 
context of entrepreneurship is the so-called tournament effect from experimental economics. 
In essence this relates to the potential differences in the manner in which the two genders 
respond to incentives. In our P-A taxonomy we suggest that males may differ from females in 
how they deal with potential incentives mismatching (Indicator 3 in Table 1). Tournament 
effects may play a role here. Tournament effects are derived from game theory, and refer to an 
approach to competitive behaviour often used in labour markets in which individuals are 
offered a choice between a fixed payment (eg a fixed salary) or a variable payment based on a 
competitive outcome, hence the name tournament. For example, this could be a salary based 
on a combination of a guaranteed salary which is augmented by a bonus or commission). Indeed 
in some circumstances the bonus or commission can amount to a significant percentage of the 
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base salary (even more than 100% in extreme cases). In terms of the six indicators in our 
taxonomy this factor also relates to the potential difference between the so-called behaviour 
based contract and the outcome (or target) based contract (Indicator 2 in Table 1). The latter 
is similar to the concept of tournament effect. 
 
Masclet et al (2015) conducted experiments across a range of scenarios to assess whether there 
are gender differences in relation to choosing between a flat-rate wage scheme and a payment 
scheme based on a tournament principle and they find such differences do exist. Interestingly, 
the authors find no significant difference in performance across the two reward systems. The 
difference only appears when individuals switch (where this is possible) from a flat wage 
system to a tournament based system: though women appear to have less scope to add to their 
performance because they tend to exert so much effort under the flat rate scheme, leaving little 
margin beyond that. However, the outcomes and responses may be different when feedback is 
available on their previous experience under a different reward system. Other authors 
(Nierderle and Vesterlund, 2007) have explained these different preferences between males 
and females in terms of risk aversion and possibly inequality aversion. This leads women to 
choose what in the literature is called “safe choices” (Holt and Laury, 2002) or “satisficing” 
behaviour. 
 
Based on the early work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) a key feature of a tournament is the so-
called prize spread. This is the difference between the ex-ante and ex-post outcome (eg 
between post and pre-promotion wages within labour markets; or the difference between the 
odds (bet and outcome) in a lottery, or some other betting context). An optimal prize spread is 
needed to incentivise the participants, as too low a spread will tend to dis-incentivise 
participants from competing; while prize spreads that are too high might encourage too many 
participants which can be expected to require contestants to be more broadly compensated than 
may be optimal and this can lead to reduced tournament efficiency. Obviously in a tournament 
context the prize (or return outcomes) will depend on: the participants’ willingness as well as 
ability to compete but also the tournament size (itself determined by its depth (the number of 
individual competitors) along with the tournament’s width. This is, in turn, related to the range 
of possible levels to the tournament, although random and serendipitous factors can also play 
a part here.   
 
Which of the P-A indicators might be used in an empirical study? 
 
In order to advance some of the P-A concepts used in Nziku and Struthers (2018) the authors 
now ask: is it possible to construct an empirical methodology that uses some (or all) of the 
indicators in Table 1 in order to test whether the motivations of female entrepreneurs, especially 
in the context of selected African countries, can be differentiated from those of men? 
Specifically: 
 
1. Do women have higher levels of risk aversion (Indicator 1 in Table 1) compared with 
men? Or is this an empirical question guided (as suggested above) by notions of loss 
aversion rather than risk aversion. In soliciting responses in the field, how should the 
questions asked be framed? For example, would the concepts of reasonable gain and 
affordable loss feature here? If so, how? 
2. Are women entrepreneurs guided more by behaviour based contracts compared with 
their male counterparts who will respond more to targets or output based contracts 
(Indicator 2 in Table 1). In addition, are they more prone to incentives mismatch 
compared with men? (Indicator 3 in Table 1). Once again, in framing questions in any 
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empirical field work, the key will be to elicit responses that detect tournament effect 
differences between men and women entrepreneurs. Practically this might be achieved 
by setting out different types of contracts for each which gauge the extent to which 
women are likely to adopt a “satisficing” approach (eg, one with a fixed return rather 
than a variable return). In a similar vein, in terms of the so-called prize spread, is this 
narrower for women compared with men?  
3. What role might “kinship”, in its broadest sense, play in these decisions? The role of 
kinship, which resonates strongly with Granovetter’s concept of SWT, can be expected 
to feature in relation to Indicator 4 in Table 1.This is concerned with a possibly greater 
tendency on the part of women entrepreneurs to engage in risk-sharing types of 
investments (eg Grameen type loans at village or community level). In framing the 
appropriate questions here we might ask respondents to consider different forms of 
loans, varying in terms of: rates of interest; repayment schedules; size of loans etc. This 
will also relate strongly to Indicators 5 and 6 in Table 1 which suggest that women, for 
the variety of reasons highlighted in the table, may otherwise incur higher transaction 
and monitoring and evaluation costs compared with men. Thus risk- sharing types of 
investments might be viewed by them as a means of obviating such higher costs.   
     
In order to elicit responses to the three issues discussed in the previous section we tentatively 
suggest some examples of the types of questions to be asked in any future empirical work based 
on our taxonomy. These appear in the Appendix and will be subject to further development in 
the next stage of the research. 
  
Contribution 
The main contribution of the paper is to apply this innovative methodology to highlight new 
insights on the SWT concept for mitigating P-A trade-offs within the context of female 
entrepreneurs in developing countries, Africa specifically. From such an approach it is 
expected that new theoretical perspectives might emerge, eg: that female entrepreneurs in such 
contexts may have different approaches to ‘income smoothing’ trade-offs within their decision 
making compared with their male counterparts (see Dercon, 2002). Another insight which can 
also be traced to an extant economics literature, is the ‘willingness to pay’ principle. Essentially 
this principle asks what individual agents (or groups) might be willing to pay to avoid a risky 
outcome, eg: business failure or loss of trust among their networks/groups or ties. This paper 
makes a potentially significant contribution to the literature from a methodological perspective 
with the ultimate aim to test the conceptual taxonomy of the P-A paradigm in the context of 
SWT among female entrepreneurs in selected African countries. Embedding the SWT concept 
within a P-A framework achieves a clearer understanding of how African women 
entrepreneurs’ respond to risk and uncertainty. This will also enable better understanding of 
the role of networks and the incentives attached to business initiatives operated by women in 
Africa.  
Policy implications 
Possible policy implications include: whether respondents would be willing to take out 
‘insurance’ to obviate some of the risks that they may face in their day to day businesses. And, 
on the question of obtaining access to finance to set up and/or expand their businesses: are 
females more likely to engage in group borrowing rather than individual borrowing which  
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characterises many developing countries and in which female entrepreneurs feature 
significantly, such as in Africa. This element, and others, can be expected to influence public 
policies to encourage female entrepreneurs, which may include public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), and Grameen type borrowing schemes etc. 
Implications for practice 
 
This research, will provide new conceptual insights which may challenge the acceptable 
wisdom with respect to female entrepreneurs in developing countries and specifically that they 
are more risk averse than men. It will also have implications for practice in the context of 
lessons that may be learned and the transferring of good practice to countries and contexts 
different from the selected countries in our future empirical study. Of course in the process, 
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Questionnaire (male and female respondents) 
     Section A 
 A1 Attitudes towards risk: 
       In your business decisions, on the following scale, how would you rank your attitude 
       towards risk (1:lowest aversion to risk; 5: highest aversion to risk) 
       1(…)      2(…)       3(…)       4(…)      5 (…) 
    A2 Behavioural versus Targets (ouput) based contracts: 
           In agreeing a business contract do you prefer behaviour based contracts to targets 
           based contracts (1: targets based; 5:behaviour based) 
          1(…)      2(…)       3(…)       4(…)      5 (…)    
    A3 Potential for goal conflict:   
           In your business how far do you try to minimise goal conflict? (eg between you and 
           your customer/supplier; between you and your lender); (1: low priority towards  
           minimising goal conflict; 5: high priority towards minimising goal conflict) 
           1(…)      2(…)       3(…)       4(…)      5 (…)   
  A4 Importance of risk sharing through networks: 
        To what extent do you engage in risk-sharing (pooling) via your networks (1: not very 
        much; 5: very much). 
        1(…)      2(…)       3(…)       4(…)      5 (…)    
  A5 Role of transaction costs 
         If you have to borrow to finance your business to what extent can you benefit from low 
         transaction costs (eg due to previous loans; economies of scale/scope etc; (1: benefit 
         very much; 5: benefit not very much) 
         1(…)      2(…)       3(…)       4(…)      5 (…) 
  A6 Verification and monitoring costs    
          If your contracts are behaviour based rather than targets based you are likely to incur 
          higher verification and monitoring costs. How far is this true for your business? (1: not 
          true; 5: very true). 
         1(…)      2(…)       3(…)       4(…)      5 (…)  
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    Section B 
(Additional questions to reflect a loss aversion approach rather than risk-aversion 
approach (male and female respondents) 
B1 Reasonable gain and affordable loss 
In your business what gain (or loss) would you consider acceptable (affordable) as a 
percentage of the original investment in your business. Your answer should be based on what 
you expect to gain (or lose) in the first 2 years from setting up your business:  
Gain: 10% (…); 15 %(…); 20% (…) 30% (…) >30% (…) 
Loss: 10% (…); 15 %(…); 20% (…) 30% (…) >30% (…) 
B2 Contract types (male and female respondents) 
In any contracts that you enter into in relation to your business you may choose one that has a 
fixed and guaranteed return (or profit); or one that is not guaranteed but has a potentially 
higher ie variable return (or profit). 
Which contract type do you prefer? Please tick the appropriate response. 
Fixed Return (…)  
Variable Return (…) 
Does your choice between these two alternatives depend on the probability associated with 
gaining a higher return? 
Yes (…) 
No (…) 
If your answer to this question is Yes what level of probability of achieving a higher return 
would be required for you to make that choice? 
0.1 (…); 0.15(…) 0.2 (…) 0.3 (…) >.3 (…) 
What is the basis for you making your choice here? Please elaborate below: 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
B3 Possible risk-sharing (eg based on kinship aka SWT) 
Do you borrow in order to invest in your business? 
Yes (…) 
No (…) 






If Yes, Why? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
If you answered Yes to this question how do you engage in such types of combined 
borrowing? 
Village or community level borrowing (…) 
Network based (eg women’s association) (…) 
Combination of both (…) 
What are the perceived benefits to you personally from engaging in these types of borrowing? 
1) Lower set-up (brokers) fees (…) 
2) Lower interest rates (…) 
3) Better repayment periods (…) 
4) Able to borrow greater sums (…) 
5) A combination of the above (…) 
  
 
 
